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Abstract— This study evaluates a traffic management concept 
designed to enable simultaneous operations of multiple small 
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) in the U.S. national airspace 
system (NAS). A five-day flight-test activity is described that 
examined the feasibility of operating multiple UAS beyond visual 
line of sight (BVLOS) of their respective operators in the same 
airspace. Over the five-day campaign, three groups of five flight 
crews operated a total of eleven different aircraft. Each group 
participated in four flight scenarios involving five simultaneous 
missions. Each vehicle was operated BVLOS up to 1.5 miles from 
the pilot in command. Findings and recommendations are 
presented to support the feasibility and safety of routine BVLOS 
operations for small UAS. 
Keywords- airspace integration; traffic management; 
Unmanned aircraft system traffic management; UTM 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
The technological advancement of unmanned aircraft 
systems (UAS) over the last few decades has created an 
emerging market that could revolutionize the aviation industry 
[1]. The Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) aerospace 
sales forecast of small commercial UAS projects an increase in 
sales of 0.6 million units in 2016 and rising to 2.7 million units 
by 2020 [2]. However, the introduction of UAS into the United 
States National Airspace System (NAS) poses challenges to 
maintaining the safety and efficiency of the current airspace. 
Many new business models propose the use of small UAS 
operating at low altitudes in environments that range from 
unpopulated farmland to densely populated cities. While the 
airspace in some of these environments is not heavily trafficked 
with manned aviation, new challenges arise from operations 
that require an aircraft to fly in and around people, property, 
terrain and man-made obstacles. Further complicating the 
challenge of integrating new aircraft in an underutilized 
airspace are: (1) the size, weight, and power constraints of UAS 
that limit their ability to carry safety-related equipment, (2) the 
numerous proposed operations that require the UAS to fly 
beyond visual line of sight of the UAS operator, and (3) the 
potential influx of hundreds of thousands of operations due to 
the emerging UAS market and low financial barriers to entry.  
NASA has advanced a concept for UAS Traffic 
Management (UTM) [3] and has initiated a research effort to 
refine that concept and develop operational and system 
requirements.  A UTM research platform has been created, and 
flight test activities have begun to evaluate core functions and 
key assumptions [4, 5], focusing exclusively on UAS 
operations within visual line of sight (VLOS) of the operator. 
The flight test activity reported here expands the range of 
operations to include operations of multiple UAS in lower-risk 
environments within and beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS). 
The UAS community is a diverse group with many members 
being new entrants to aviation. There is often stark differences 
in culture between the UAS community and the traditional 
aviation community that creates a challenging environment for 
integrating a rapidly developing new technology into the NAS. 
The objective of this flight test was exploratory, to demonstrate 
the basic feasibility of these types of airspace operations—
termed UTM Technical Capability Level 2—and uncover issues 
and challenges that NASA and the UAS community will need 
to confront going forward.  Furthermore, the results presented 
in this paper also serve to inform the UAS community of areas 
for improvement and inform the traditional aviation community 
of potential hazards to existing airspace users given the 
introduction of UAS into the NAS. 
II. UAS TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT (UTM) 
The FAA's establishment of 14 CFR § 107 enabled routine 
access for UAS operators into the NAS. While many business 
cases were supported by the provisions of 14 CFR § 107, a 
significant barrier preventing the proliferation of UAS 
applications is the limitation in the current regulation that 
restricts operations to remain within visual line of sight of the 
operator. Allowing BVLOS operations would enable a variety 
of UAS applications. However, BVLOS operations introduce 
many airspace integration and safety challenges. Barriers to 
allowing multiple BVLOS operations in the airspace include: 
inability to assure safe separation from other aircraft, spectrum 
management, surveillance and navigation, and contingency 
management in off-nominal conditions (e.g. lost link, loss of 
control). The National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) and the FAA have initiatives underway to identify and 
respond to the range of challenges and ensure the safety and 
integrity of the NAS.  
UTM has become relevant beyond the US. A study 
sponsored by Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) 
Joint Undertaking (JU) identified air traffic management 
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technologies as one of the key enablers to future UAS 
operations, and it was recommended that the European Union 
(EU) create a UTM system to coordinate and share airspace 
between manned and unmanned systems [6]. SESAR JU has 
initiated a call for funding UTM related approaches [7]. Other 
countries, such as Sweden, have already begun conducting 
research related to the UTM concept [8]. The European Aviation 
Safety Agency (EASA) and NASA have been coordinating 
approaches to safely enable large-scale small UAS operations.  
A Riga declaration, developed by the European aviation 
community,  in 2015 identified UTM-related technologies as a 
strong starting point to address the rising demand for UAS 
operations [9]. In a recent Warsaw declaration [10], the EU 
identified a key focus on integrating UAS in low-altitude urban 
operations for the U-Space initiative, a concept similar to UTM. 
A global UTM association (https://utm.aero) was formed by the 
UAS industry to harmonize protocols, architectures, and data 
exchange definitions across multiple countries. At large, the 
UTM research effort serves as a pathfinder by the global 
community as a model to safely integrate small UAS operations 
in the low-altitude airspace. 
UTM is intended to support safe and efficient UAS 
operations in low-altitude airspace by providing information and 
services to UAS operators and other NAS stakeholders [3]. The 
five core principles of UTM are: (1) only authenticated 
operations are allowed in the airspace, (2) UAS should avoid 
each other, (3) UAS should avoid manned aircraft, (4) UAS 
operators should have complete awareness of all constraints in 
the airspace, and (5) public safety UAS have priority within the 
airspace. These principles—as well as the concept’s guiding 
tenet: flexibility where possible and structure where 
necessary—provide a framework for the development of a UTM 
system that is different from the current ATM system that 
supports manned aviation.  
The UTM construct utilizes industry’s ability to supply 
services where these services do not exist (e.g., uncontrolled 
airspace). In this construct, the FAA will maintain regulatory 
and operational authority for airspace and traffic operations. 
Through UTM, FAA will provide directives, constraints, and 
authorizations or restrictions. The FAA’s Air Traffic 
Organization will institute operational constraints at any time, 
and the FAA will have on-demand access to airspace operators 
and situation awareness of airspace operations continuously 
through UTM. It is expected that the UTM construct will be 
scalable to other airspace and vehicle classes as well.  
In order to test and evaluate UTM concept elements and 
technologies, NASA has developed a UTM research platform. 
The specifications of the research platform and the results of 
evaluations that employ it—such as the present study—will be 
available as research transition products to the FAA and other 
stakeholders, as appropriate, to assist in the implementation of 
UTM capabilities that meet NAS service expectations. 
NASA is spearheading the development and validation of 
UTM concept elements with its partners using combinations of 
simulations and field trials. The tests are aligned with NASA’s 
spiral development and evaluation schedule of Technical 
Capability Levels (TCL) that examine feasibility of increasingly 
complex operations. Each TCL extends the capabilities of the 
previous TCL. Each capability is targeted to specific types of 
applications, geographical areas, and use cases that represent 
certain risk levels. The pace of development targets a new UTM 
TCL to be tested and evaluated in simulation and flight trials 
every 12–18 months. Figure 1 summarizes these capabilities. 
As depicted in Figure 1, each UTM technical capability level 
has increasing scope and complexity to support a diverse and 
growing number of UAS operations. TCL 1, which supports 
notification-based operations in remote and rural areas, was 
tested in August 2015 at a closed airstrip in Crows Landing, 
California, USA [4]. This TCL was later tested more broadly at 
six FAA-designated UAS Test Sites across the United States [5].  
  
Figure 1: NASA UTM planned technical capability level progression.  
The NASA UTM concept has identified a risk-based 
approach towards the introduction of routine low-altitude 
operations. The TCL 1 and TCL 2 environments are perceived 
as an appropriate near-term entry point to address barriers and 
develop regulations that enable routine UAS operations. The 
work presented in this paper focuses on the lessons learned from 
field testing of the TCL 2 BVLOS operations. 
III. TCL 2 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
A key aspect of TCL 2 is the ability for operators to plan and 
schedule BVLOS operations. The addition of BVLOS 
operations contributes to an increased level of operational 
complexity and increased risk to other users of the airspace. 
Multiple BVLOS and VLOS missions that simultaneously 
access the same areas of operation create potential airborne 
conflict hazards.  
UAS applications in a TCL 2 environment may include 
precision agriculture, rural package delivery, or long-range 
pipeline inspection. Public safety and security operations in a 
TCL 2 environment are given priority use of the airspace. In the 
NASA UTM Concept of Operations (CONOPS) [3], separation 
between UAS in a TCL 2 environment is supported by de-
conflicting planned operational volumes—as managed by the 
UTM research platform—and requiring each UAS to stay within 
its respective operation volume (e.g. geo-fencing). Furthermore, 
separation between UAS and manned aircraft is facilitated by 
notifying manned aircraft of planned UAS operational areas.  
The UTM research platform TCL 1 core functionality 
included features such as: planning and scheduling operational 
areas prior to departure, connection from the ground control 
station (GCS) or aircraft to the UTM research platform via an 
application protocol interface (API), monitoring aircraft 
conformance to operational plans, and aircraft tracking. TCL 2 
test capabilities included safety enhancements such as: 
proximity alerting, intruder alerts, contingency management 
alerts, four-dimensional (4D) segmented flight planning and 
scheduling, dynamic re-routing, and support for priority 
operations. These are discussed further below. To enable more 
efficient use of the airspace, the UTM research platform 
supports altitude stratification for efficient airspace operations.  
Features of the UTM research platform, such as proximity 
alerting and intruder alerting, are meant to raise situation 
awareness to nearby operators that another aircraft is 
unexpectedly entering airspace near them. An intruder alert is 
generated from an external surveillance system that is tracking a 
non-participating aircraft (manned or unmanned). Contingency 
management alerts allow an operator to self-report anomalous 
behavior with their aircraft to the UTM research platform and 
implement a contingency management system (CMS) action 
(e.g. return to base). The UTM research platform will notify 
impacted proximal operations of the contingency management 
action taken so that all users are aware of the emergency and the 
airspace integrity is not further degraded by secondary conflicts. 
Dynamic re-routing allows for operators to change their 
operational plans while the aircraft is aloft to enable more agile 
operations. Segmented flight planning allows for more efficient 
use of the airspace and priority operations functionality will 
support public safety or security operations by clearing pre-
existing UAS operations within the airspace. 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
The TCL 2 flight test focused on evaluating the feasibility of 
conducting multiple BVLOS operations in an environment 
relevant to the TCL 2 CONOPS. This section details the 
methodology used in developing the range, infrastructure, 
objectives and scenarios, UAS platforms, and other factors that 
impacted the flight testing. 
The flight test demonstration was conducted at the Reno-
Stead Airport (RTS) UAS Test Range in Reno, Nevada, USA. 
The RTS UAS Test Range is a part of the State of Nevada UAS 
Test Site. This test site was one of six sites designated in 2013 
across the United States to test and develop UAS technologies. 
The RTS UAS Test Range is a basin and range topography that 
includes flat, dry desert surrounded by steep climbing 
mountains. Furthermore, at a 5,050 ft elevation, experiencing 
variable weather conditions, and a location 2 miles north of an 
active runway in uncontrolled airspace, the RTS UAS Test 
Range exercises a variety of challenges associated with 
conducting BVLOS operations. 
A. Test Range and Infrastructure  
Flight operations occurred within a test range area, depicted 
in Figure 2, where the red boundary represents the extent of the 
test range and the green shaded area represents the maximum 
geographic range that was used for flight planning and 
operations. Five ground control station (GCS) locations were 
situated along the perimeter of the flight area. Weather 
equipment, including a 30-ft weather tower, a sonic detection 
and ranging (SODAR) meteorological instrument, and light 
detection and ranging (LIDAR) meteorological instruments [6], 
were co-located at the GCS 3 location.  
 
Figure 2: UAS test range north of RTS Airfield. 
Each GCS location was staffed with flight crews, range 
safety support, and human factors researchers. Each UAS 
connected to the UTM research platform through an API [12] 
over a cellular telecommunications network. The connection to 
the UTM research platform was facilitated by the development 
of a client application that was typically resident on the ground 
control station of the UAS. This client provided telemetry and 
operational plan information to the UTM research platform, 
received messages and alerts during operations, and provided 
information about other nearby operations. The Mobile UTM 
application [13], as depicted in Figure 3, was displayed on an 
iPad at each GCS location. This airspace display provided 
additional access to, and visualization of, information about 
current or proposed operations in the airspace. Visual observers 
were used to facilitate safe flight operations during instances 
when aircraft were BVLOS of their operators. 
 
Figure 3: Mobile UTM application situation awareness display. 
Two ground surveillance radar systems (manufactured by 
SRC Inc.) provided coverage of the area in and around the UAS 
test range. The LSTAR V2 radar provided surveillance coverage 
of manned aircraft flying near the UAS test range. The SRHawk 
Radar provided surveillance coverage of UAS operations within 
the UAS test range. In addition, half of UAS were equipped with 
ADS-B Out transponders during the test and an ADS-B ground 
receiver was stationed at the GCS 3 location. Surveillance feeds 
from the LSTAR, SRHawk, ADS-B, and GPS positions as 
reported from the UTM research platform were integrated into a 
single airspace display. Surveillance position reports were sent 
to the UTM research platform via an API and provided real-time 
data for “intruder” UAS that were deployed as part of the test 
scenarios. Some vehicles also were equipped with the ability to 
be tracked over the cellular network. 
B. Test Objectives and Scenarios  
The primary flight test objective was to investigate the 
operational feasibility of UTM providing services to support 
multiple BVLOS and VLOS operations in lower risk 
environments. More specifically, the objectives were to explore 
how well the UTM research platform addresses the barriers 
preventing UAS BVLOS operations and identify potential 
improvements. To facilitate this evaluation, four hypothetical 
scenarios were crafted. These scenarios encapsulated different 
hazards associated with operations in the TCL 2 environment. 
The scenarios were designed to encompass the range of 
interactions likely to occur in the future operational context in 
which UTM is deployed. Scenarios contain the following 
general attributes: altitude stratification, a nearby intruder 
aircraft, a non-conformant or rogue aircraft, a public safety and 
security operator, re-routing flight while aircraft is aloft, and 
secondary conflicts due to contingency management actions 
(e.g., return to base). 
 
Figure 4: TCL 2 flight demonstration test matrix. 
In addition, simulated vehicle operations injected into the 
scenario using a live-virtual-constructive environment [13] 
enabled higher levels of complexity in some of the scenarios. 
Figure 4 highlights the test matrix that exercised the different 
attributes of the scenarios and features of the UTM research 
platform. 
Each scenario was 20-25 minutes in duration with 
continuous operation of up to five vehicles operating within the 
same airspace. For example, in Scenario 2, as depicted in  Figure 
5, aircraft at each GCS location were given specific missions: 
traffic monitoring, cell tower inspection, forest ranger, and news 
reporting. Live vehicles were flown at altitude ranges of 200-
500 ft height above take-off location for GCS 2-5 locations. A 
virtual aircraft was operated at the GCS 1 location. As the 
scenario developed, UAS operators at the GCS 3 location were 
searching for a lost hiker that was located in the north end of the 
range. Upon finding the lost hiker, a traffic monitoring mission 
was re-purposed as a medical supply delivery operation and re-
routed using priority airspace access to clear the airspace of 
extraneous operations and provide supporting equipment and 
supplies to the lost hiker until an evacuation could be made. 
Meanwhile, the cell tower inspection and news coverage 
operations were made aware of the nearby operations occurring 
in the area and any impacts their activities might have on their 
subsequent operations.  
Eleven different flight crews—two NASA crews and nine 
industry partners—participated in the flight test. In each of the 
four scenarios, a vehicle was flown from each of the five GCS 
locations. Each flight crew performed a series of proficiency 
flights and, at minimum, two scenarios per flight day. Due to 
visibility conditions and the weather, flight activity typically was 
restricted between 8:30am and 12:30pm local time.  
 
Figure 5: Scenario 2 demonstrating operations with altitude stratification. 
C. UAS Test Platforms and Flight Crews 
All vehicles were under 55 pounds, as listed in Table 1, and 
had a client that connected to the UTM research platform. All 
vehicles were capable of sustained flight over 15 minutes. With 
the exception of the Iris+, all vehicles had a command and 
control link coverage rated to at least 2 miles. Due to the terrain 
limitations for take-off and landing, fixed wing aircraft were 
only operated from GCS 3 and GCS 5 locations, whereas multi-
rotors were operated from GCS 1, GCS 2, and GCS 4 locations. 
All multi-rotors had a vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) 
capability, while the fixed-wing aircraft had different 
mechanisms for take-off and landing, such as rail launch, hand 
launch, belly landing or parachute landing.  
During the flight operations, flight crews were observed by 
human factors researchers at each of the GCS locations. Human 
factors observations were collected before, during and after 
flights. Flight crews completed questionnaires after each flight, 
and a debriefing interview was conducted at the end of each day. 
The results and discussion in this paper will focus on key 
findings as observed by the human factors researchers and flight 
crews on the utility of the UTM research platform to manage 
traffic and support BVLOS operations in a TCL 2 environment. 
 
Table 1: UAS platforms used in TCL 2 demonstration. 
Vehicle Manufacturer Type Vehicle Mass (lbs) 
Endurance 
(min) 
Medium 
Wing 
Silent Falcon 
Technologies 
Fixed-wing 33 200 
SkyRange
r 
Aeryon Labs 
Inc. 
Quadcopter 6.5 50 
Ptarmigan ACUASI Quadcopter 15 20 
Puma AE AeroVironme
nt 
Fixed-wing 13.8 210 
Iris+ 3DR Quadcopter 2.8 20 
Tempest UASUSA Fixed-Wing 14.8 90 
AR180 Air Robot Quadcopter 11.5 40 
Cinestar 8 Cinestar Octocopter 13.9 25 
Phantom 
3 
DJI Quadcopter 2.5 23 
Bramor C-Astral Fixed Wing 9.8 150 
Lancaster 
5 
Precision 
Hawk 
Fixed Wing 6.5 45 
D. Test Description 
The NASA UTM TCL 2 demonstration was conducted 
October 17-25, 2016. There was a total of five flight days for the 
demonstration, and one planned flight day was canceled due to 
high winds. All other days in the testing period were used for 
safety briefings and ground testing. The flight activity consisted 
of warm-up proficiency flights and data collection scenarios. 
Overall there were 74 take-offs and landings during the testing 
period, which amounted to 13.5 flight hours across 11 different 
UAS platforms. Of the 74 total flights, 35 of the flights were 
slated for data collection from the four scenarios. 
 
Figure 6: Average wind speed as measured by the 30 ft wind tower. 
Data were collected for flights with VLOS and BVLOS 
profiles. Flight durations were between 6 and 23 minutes and 
ranged from VLOS operations at 1000-3000 ft from the launch 
location to BVLOS operations from 4000-9000 ft from the 
launch location. The maximum distance at which a pilot could 
maintain VLOS for a UAS was largely dictated by visibility 
conditions, size and appearance of the vehicle, and operator’s 
ability to observe the oprientation of the aircraft. Flights were 
typically flown between 200 ft and 500 ft height above the take-
off location and had a ground speed ranging from 11 knots to 60 
knots with an average of 40 knots.  
The environmental conditions had substantial impacts on the 
testing and performance of the aircraft. Initial testing at the RTS 
UAS test range under warm temperature conditions, between 87 
– 95 °F, yielded density altitude conditions around 9,000 ft MSL, 
which is well above the 5050 ft elevation of the test range. These 
conditions significantly reduced the endurance of the UAS. 
During the demonstration temperatures subsided to the 30-50 °F 
range which provided a more favorable density altitude of 4,000 
ft MSL, however high winds became a significant factor. 
The test procedure specified an operational limit of 15 knots 
sustained wind speed, above which operations were to be halted. 
As depicted in Figure 6, the operational limit was reached on 
Oct. 24th and Oct. 25th.  In the former case the flight day was 
canceled, and in the latter case the flight day was ended early. In 
addition to strong wind conditions, variability in the wind across 
the test range—both on the ground and at different altitudes—
made predicting aircraft performance challenging. As shown in 
Figure 7, the variable topography of the test range resulted in 
wind direction, speed, and variability that was significantly 
different across the range.  
 
Figure 7: Elevation contours of the test range measured in MSL altitude. 
The wind profiles, as depicted in Figure 6, were measured 
from the top of a 30-ft weather tower that was co-located with 
GCS 3 and often represented lower wind measurements than 
those reported by flight crews at other locations, particularly at 
the GCS 5 and GCS 4 locations. This terrain created 
microclimates within the planetary boundary layer. These 
microclimates exhibited various meteorological phenomena 
such as variable wind shear, thermals, microbursts, and large 
variations in wind speed on the ground and aloft. These 
environmental factors exposed interesting considerations when 
operating multiple BVLOS missions within the same airspace, 
as is detailed in the subsequent sections. 
V. RESULTS 
This flight test focused on exploring the feasibility of 
conducting multiple UAS operations, involving VLOS and 
BVLOS simultaneously within the same area. The flight test 
resulted in breadth of data and findings that inform the UAS 
community and regulator of potential hazards and 
recommendations to support BVLOS. This paper presents an 
overview of four key findings from the flight test and offers 
recommendations for new capabilities, standards or practices to 
address them. For brevity, the paper presents an overview of the 
main findings, however future analysis will be presented to 
further substantiate each of the findings presented in this paper. 
The findings stem from human factors observations of the use of 
the UTM research platform by the test participants as well as the 
technical limitations and operational considerations when 
performing multiple BVLOS operations in a rural operational 
environment. These findings and recommendations are expected 
to help inform future research and the development of industry 
standards.  
Key Finding  1 (KF1): The UTM research platform 
provided key information needed by operators to 
successfully conduct missions amongst other nearby 
operations and with an awareness of airspace constraints. 
Currently UAS operate in sparse density and operators are not 
always aware of other operations planned in the area without 
direct coordination. Current commercial operations are VLOS 
and thus the limited awareness is mitigated by the close 
proximity of the operators. The environmental conditions of the 
TCL 2 flight test exposed potential safety implications of 
operating BVLOS that need consideration as operations start to 
scale in size and density. Some of the industry flight crews that 
participated in the demonstration had experience flying with 
other vehicles within their company’s fleet, but few had 
experience flying in the same area with multiple operators. 
Differences in procedures, onboard contingency management 
systems and vehicle performance made it evident that some 
amount of information sharing was needed in order to ensure 
operational behavior of proximal operations was known and 
predictable. Prior to flight, operators expressed a desire to 
review the plans of other aicraft that would be in the vicinity of 
their operation, particularly those that would be altitude 
stratified. The flight crews communicated with other operators 
to ensure they knew the intent of other operators during high risk 
areas of the operation, particularly to confirm a vehicles’ 
altitude, and to review contingency management procedures. In 
this latter case, operators wanted to ensure vehicles would not 
descend into each other in the case of off-nominal conditions. In 
preparation for the demonstration, flight crews developed UTM 
clients that adhered to an API defined in [12]. This API gave 
operators access to operational data from all nearby operators in 
the UTM research platform, however it was at the discretion of 
the operators as to what information they integrated and 
displayed into their GCS. The Mobile UTM application was 
available for all operators that did not implement airspace 
information into their GCS. During operations, the flight crews 
used their UTM Clients and the Mobile UTM application to 
monitor their flight path with respect to other air traffic and 
various alerts generated by the UTM research platform. The 
flight crews reported that the airspace information was important 
to their ability to maintain situation awareness during the 
operations and maintain their flight path within the operational 
boundaries, particularly during manual phases of flight. Overall, 
operators reported that the UTM information available to them 
yielded a reasonable level of awareness of other airborne 
operations with respect to their own. Initially, operators held a 
self-centered view of their operations with respect to others. As 
flight crews became more familiar with the UTM displays, they 
used them to monitor other operations that came within close 
proximity of their own. Upon using the Mobile UTM 
application, the flight crews shifted their strategies to include 
requests of operational plans from other operators to develop a 
better understanding of how their operation might be impacted 
by others in the airspace. The operators expressed a desire for a 
predictable behavior of proximal UAS and needed 
understanding of nominal and off-nominal conditions (e.g. lost 
link, loss of GPS, low battery). 
Recommendation 1 (R1): Operators should display 
airspace information and have access to information from 
other operators. In addition to access to information about 
other proximal operations in flight planning, it is crucial that 
operators have access to dynamic changes in airspace during 
operations. It is recommended to expand the data that is shared 
in [12] to include information needed for other operators to react 
to a nearby aircraft undergoing an off-nominal state. This 
information could include, but is not limited to, contingency 
diversion locations, contingency action (e.g. return to base, land 
now, parachute deployment, etc.), last known position, altitude, 
heading, speed, and battery life remaining, aircraft endurance, 
and type of failure state (e.g. lost link, loss of control, etc.). 
Furthermore, the ability to communicate with other operators 
during off-nominal conditions would greatly improve an 
operator’s ability to react to hazardous conditions caused by 
other users of the airspace. 
KF2: Measurement and reporting of vehicle altitude was 
not consistent among airspace users. A wide variety of UAS 
platforms exists today, and differences in measuring altitude can 
pose hazards to the UAS, airspace, or obstacles, or persons on 
the ground. Most UAS are equipped with GPS systems that 
provide latitude and longitude measurements (often used for 
waypoint navigation) and a geometric height measurement that 
is an approximation of mean sea level (MSL) altitude (also 
known as absolute altitude). GPS is based on a constellation of 
satellites and inherently can have errors that vary largely based 
on the number of satellites within line-of-sight of a receiver at a 
given time, geometric distribution of these satellites in space, 
and atmospheric conditions [14]. In many ground control 
stations, the altitude is presented to the operator relative to the 
GPS-measured altitude at takeoff. Furthermore, some UAS 
platforms utilize technologies (e.g., laser altimeter) to measure 
height above terrain. Most manned aircraft and some UAS also 
measure altitude by using barometric pressure, which makes use 
of the difference between the static pressure onboard the aircraft 
and the pressure at sea level provided from a ground station to 
measure the MSL altitude (also known as indicated altitude). 
Around airports, manned aviation also measures height above 
field elevation with respect to a fixed point at an airport rather 
than measured directly below the aircraft.  
During the flight demonstration, two incidents occurred in 
which different altitude measurement methods posed hazards to 
BVLOS operations. The first incident occurred from a lack of 
proper awareness of an aircraft’s altitude relative to terrain 
during flight planning and operations. This resulted in a 
controlled flight into terrain. The flight was launched from the 
GCS 2 location, depicted in Figure 2, and traveled due north 
BVLOS at an altitude of 150 ft above the take-off location. 
Unbeknownst to the operator, the elevation of the terrain rose 
over 150 ft with respect to the GCS 2 take-off location. The 
aircraft maintained its operational altitude with respect to its 
take-off location and inadvertently exercised a controlled flight 
into terrain as the terrain rose above the elevation of the take-off 
location. As the aircraft was BVLOS of the operator, there was 
no direct indication that the aircraft was approaching the ground, 
and the low-altitude behavior was reported by a visual observer 
without sufficient time to avoid an impact with terrain.  This 
event highlighted the need for any operation that is flying 
BVLOS to have information regarding ground obstacles and 
elevation of the local terrain. Furthermore, operators should be 
aware of how their UAS reports altitude, such that they are not 
creating a potential collision hazard with objects in the air or on 
the ground.  
Ambiguity of a vehicle’s reported altitude contributed to a 
second type of hazard. On several occasions during the flight 
test, manned traffic that posed a threat was called out as reported 
by the ground-based surveillance radars and visual observers. 
However, the reported altitude was called out as MSL altitude, 
which caused confusion because many operators had systems 
that reported their altitude in height above terrain or height 
above take-off location. In addition, differences in the units of 
measure used by each UAS caused confusion amongst operators 
when altitudes were reported. When de-conflicting UAS 
operations during flight planning in the UTM research platform, 
it became necessary to require a consistent altitude measurement 
for the missions as operators were unfamiliar with each other’s 
platforms and didn’t realize that they reported altitude in 
different ways. While operating BVLOS  all operators will need 
to use a consistent altitude standard. 
R2: Altitude reporting should be consistent or 
translatable across airspace users. Differences in how altitude 
is measured and reported can increase the likelihood of airborne 
collisions and controlled flight into terrain. To address these 
hazards, the UAS community should agree upon a common 
altitude measure for information sharing and reporting, common 
units of measure, and an acceptable error tolerance for each 
measurement that can be used to accurately reflect conformance 
to constraints and approved airspace authorized by the air 
navigation service provider (ANSP), consistency amongst UAS 
operators to provide support for separation provisions, 
avoidance of terrain and obstacles, and compatible reporting and 
communication with manned aviation to ensure safe separation.  
KF3: The sources of weather information for this flight 
test were inadequate to support BVLOS operations. During 
the demonstration the significant variability in observed weather 
based on location exposed a hazard for BVLOS operations. As 
expected, small UAS are easily, adversely affected by inclement 
weather conditions. However, it was evident that despite the 
many weather-sensing instruments that were available at the test 
range, there was poor awareness of the localized weather 
conditions that the vehicle was experiencing. The regional and 
national forecasts that were available were not of sufficient 
fidelity to provide useful information with regard to the local 
region and time frame in which the UAS were operating. Each 
morning, weather conditions were briefed by the range safety 
personnel; briefings contained information from several weather 
sources: local weather forecasts and reports, current conditions 
from the airport’s automated weather observation system 
(AWOS), and current atmospheric conditions from a weather 
station at the GCS 3 location. Prior to and during operations, 
current wind conditions were announced from the AWOS, 
handheld wind meters at each GCS location, and in limited 
circumstances from some of the UAS that were equipped with 
weather-sensing equipment. BVLOS flights were occasionally 
aborted after pilots experienced undesirable vehicle 
performance as a result of turbulent weather, despite the fact that 
ground atmospheric conditions at the GCS location were mild. 
Rapid changes in wind conditions at different GCS locations and 
areas of operations resulted in operators being unable to 
accurately predict vehicle endurance, which resulted in delayed 
take-off times and unplanned landings. Although the scenarios 
were less than 30 minutes in length, significant changes in wind 
speed –as much as 10+ kts—were observed between the 
beginning and end of a scenario, such that some multi-rotor 
aircraft had difficulty landing due to high crosswinds. 
Throughout the TCL 2 testing, warm and cold temperatures 
impacted operations. Warm temperatures drove the density 
altitude up to 9,000 ft MSL and drastically shortened the 
endurance of many of the multi-rotor platforms. This resulted in 
operations that had unplanned emergency landings, and it forced 
operators to make critical battery voltage thresholds in the UAS 
contingency management system more conservative than their 
normal operations. During cooler temperatures, the density 
altitude decreased below the elevation, to 4,000 ft MSL, and in 
the morning when wind speed was low, fixed wing vehicles had 
shallow take-offs and landings. In the afternoon the wind speed 
increased and at times multi-rotors experienced micro-bursting 
phenomena that reduced endurance, while fixed-wing aircraft at 
times flew through thermals that increased their altitude as much 
as 200 ft. While operators can measure atmospheric conditions 
on the ground prior to take-off and look at local weather reports 
from sensors that may be miles away, in certain environments it 
doesn’t guarantee adequate foresight and awareness of the 
atmospheric conditions along their intended flight paths.  
R3: Weather information sources should be augmented 
with in-situ reports from UAS and GCS and shared with 
other users in the airspace. The degradation in performance of 
UAS to adverse atmospheric conditions (e.g. high winds, density 
altitude, etc.) and the lack of sufficient forecasting and 
measurement pose arguably the most significant hazard to 
BVLOS operations. Despite several instruments at the 
demonstration measuring local atmospheric conditions, the 
diversity of micro-climates at each launch location and 
experienced along the aircraft’s flight path made it impractical 
to extend the weather measured from any one particular source 
to be representative of the entire range. The most representative 
data regarding the atmospheric conditions generally came from 
measurements at the launch locations, reported from handheld 
anemometers, and the measurements reported from the UAS 
while they were aloft. While the basin and range topography of 
the UAS test range may have exacerbated the extent to which 
each location had noticeably different conditions, the inherent 
hazard is that parts of the boundary layer are not observed, by 
national weather products, with granular enough grid sizes and 
short enough time horizons to support UAS operations. 
Furthermore, current local weather measurements also may not 
be sufficient based on the topology of the operating environment 
and the distance from the weather station. In the absence of 
sufficient sources of weather information, improvements can be 
made to support BVLOS and support the development of 
weather products that can eventually provide support for 
environments more complex than TCL 2. By sharing reports of 
atmospheric conditions on the surface, at the operators launch 
site, and aloft, as measured onboard the vehicle, and sharing that 
information with other users through a UTM system, UAS 
operations can benefit by: (1) Comparing local weather reports 
with observed weather by other operators to improve their 
awareness of conditions along their flight path, (2) collecting 
data for further development on location-based boundary layer 
and surface weather models to support future missions in that 
particular area. Ultimately the responsibility to identify the 
presence of atmospheric conditions that would be unacceptable 
to their particular UAS lies with the operator.  
R4: Initial routine BVLOS operations should not 
conduct altitude stratification unless there is accurate and 
timely information shared of the relative position of nearby 
UAS  and improvements are made in the fidelity of the 
weather predictions along the flight path. The altitude 
stratification construct was considered to enable higher densities 
of UAS to operate within the same airspace, thus allowing for 
large-scale UAS operations to occur in the near future. However, 
when vehicles operate BVLOS the operator has a reduced 
awareness and increased reaction time (due to present-day 
operating tools and assumptions) with respect to maintaining the 
separation with other airborne objects. Uncertainties in 
navigation error and the influence of weather can increase the 
potential collision hazard. During the demonstration many 
different weather phenomena were experienced that could have 
potential implications for multiple BVLOS operations. At one 
point in a scenario, two fixed-wing aircraft were altitude 
stratified, separated by 200 ft, and the aircraft were both flying 
a loitering pattern. The aircraft with the lower altitude 
experienced thermal activity which rapidly increased its altitude 
such that it was approximately co-altitude with the aircraft that 
was flying at the higher altitude. While no collision avoidance 
maneuvering was necessary, the scenario exposed a potential 
collision hazard whose likelihood was dramatically increased 
over a short time horizon due to a lack of coordinated action 
between the UAS and an insufficient forecasting and 
measurement of potential weather hazards. In a TCL 2 
environment, without a common altitude reference or collision 
avoidance mechanism on-board the aircraft and without 
improvements in weather products it is not advisable to conduct 
altitude stratification for the initial introduction of BVLOS 
operations into the NAS. 
KF4: Operational plans were not always consistent 
between the UTM System, GCS and UAS. To facilitate 
separation by segregation of UAS, the UTM research platform 
de-conflicts operations by ensuring that no two operational plans 
submitted to the UTM system intersect in time and space. This 
approach allows for scheduled use of the airspace and prevents 
operators from simultaneously flying into the same location in 
the design of their missions. The UTM research platform also 
prevents UAS operators from designing missions that fly into 
airspace in which they are not authorized to operate (e.g. 
controlled airspace). During operations, an operational plan—
also known as a flight geography—is submitted to the UTM 
system. If it is free from conflicts, it is accepted by the UTM 
research platform as a valid plan. It is expected that when an 
operator submits a flight geography to the system, it represents 
an area that encompasses the entire extent of their intended 
operation under nominal conditions. The UTM research 
platform then assigns a slightly larger region around the flight 
geography to monitor for conformance violations; this is known 
as the conformance geography. The volume between the flight 
geography and the conformance geography is a buffer that 
allows for navigation errors during execution of the operation. If 
a vehicle exits the conformance geography, it is considered non-
conforming to its operational plan. Another volume is assigned 
around the conformance geography, known as the protected 
geography. This volume is the full extent of the airspace that 
operation is allowed to occupy. If a vehicle exits the protected 
geography,  it is potentially entering into another operations’ 
airspace and is considered a rogue aircraft. 
An example of the flight geography (blue area), 
conformance geography (green line), and protected geography 
(red line) associated with an operation is depicted in Figure 8. 
The flight path flown by the UAS is shown in white. The flight-
path line is shown in blue when the UAS exits the flight 
geography, green when it exits the conformance geography and 
red when it exits the protected geography. For the 
demonstration, the distances between the boundaries of the 
flight geography, the conformance geography and the protected 
geography are provided in Table 2. The values were selected 
conservatively to iniate alerting.  
 
Figure 8: Flight geography, conformance geography, and protected geography 
of an operational plan. 
During the demonstration, flight crews were given 
operational areas and notional flight paths in which to exercise 
different functions of the UTM research platform. The flight 
crews were instructed to adjust the flight plans and operational 
volumes so that they aligned with the capabilities and limitations 
of their respective platforms. The operational areas were 
intended to encompass all nominal phases of the flight and be 
large enough to accommodate the aircraft’s flight path, yet small 
enough not to intrude on another flight crew’s operation. 
Table 2: Distance from the flight geography. 
 Multi-Rotor Fixed Wing 
Horizontal  Vertical  Horizontal  Vertical  
Conformance Geography 40 ft 15 ft 64 ft  30 ft 
Protected Geography 100 ft 35 ft 124 ft 50 ft 
 
Of the 35 flights that were conducted during data collection, 
54% of the flights remained within the flight geography. The 
remaining 46% of the flights left their flight geography at least 
once during their mission. The most common instance of non-
conformance was due to the performance of the vehicle. These 
were violations when the operational plan did not properly 
account for the turn radius of the aircraft or consider its launch 
or landing trajectory. These instances of exiting the flight 
geography were brief with respect to their total mission time, 
and in each case they promptly returned to their flight 
geography. To remedy these types of errors, larger volumes 
should be included around the take-off and landing site, and a 
minimum lateral and vertical distance should be established for 
each UAS platform based on the turn radius and climb/descent 
rate, navigation error, and max wind tolerances of the vehicle.  
In several cases the environment played a role in a 
conformance violation. Variable wind direction made some of 
the flight crews change the launch direction for the safety of the 
vehicle. In doing so, the initial launch trajectory sometimes went 
outside their flight geography until they reached their first 
waypoint. This type of violation could be resolved procedurally 
by verifying flight geography prior to take-off. Furthermore, 
improvements can be made by automation of the UTM Client 
factoring in launch direction and requesting a flight plan 
modification from the UTM research platform.  
The remaining conformance violations resulted in non-
conformances of longer duration. Operator error in submitting 
waypoints or altitudes in the GCS commanded the vehicles to 
leave their flight geographies. Operator error also contributed to 
violations occurring during manual flight modes, un-reported 
return-to-base maneuvers (due to low battery), and inadvertent 
submission of erroneous flight geography to the UTM research 
platform as compared to what was entered into the GCS. These 
violations could be resolved thorough training for operators and 
more intelligent automation in the UTM Client and GCS. 
Of the 46% of aircraft that left their flight geography, as 
depicted in Figure 9, the majority of infractions deviated no 
further than 500 ft laterally and 20 ft vertically for fixed wing 
and 180 ft laterally for the multi-rotors. There were no vertical 
violations for the multi-rotor aircraft. Deviations that were larger 
than these values were due to operator error. Most instances of 
non-conformance were a result of the UAS exiting the flight 
geography momentarily and then returning. Adjustments to the 
conformance and protected geographies listed in Table 2 can be 
made based on the plots like Figure 9 to establish appropriate 
buffer sizes for TCL 2 operations. 
R5: Flight trajectories should be contained within geo-
fence boundaries that are shared with the UTM research 
platform and enforced by the aircraft. Integration of a UTM 
Client such that the geo-fence boundary that contains the 
operation is uploaded to the vehicle and shared with UTM 
System will eliminate many of the errors encountered at the 
flight test. Often pilot errors were due to an operator submitting 
an operational plan to UTM and uploading a different 
operational plan to the UAS. This mitigation could be further 
reinforced by displaying the geo-fence boundary on the GCS 
awareness display, as recommended in R1. 
VI. FUTURE WORK 
Overall the flight test findings are consistent with the 
hypothesis that a UTM system could manage multiple BVLOS 
operations in a TCL 2 environment if the recommendations, 
presented in the prior section, can be addressed. The five core 
principles and the guiding tenet of the UTM Concept, shown in 
Table 3, were exercised during the flight test. Awareness to the 
environment in which the UAS are operating is a core principle 
that was supported by key findings KF1 and KF3. 
Recommendations to industry in data information sharing and 
more effective weather products are detailed in R1 and R3, 
respectively. UAS operators can enhance safety by effectively 
sharing data and additional studies should investigate required 
information in off-nominal conditions. Future analysis will 
focus on the effectiveness of the flight crews using their UTM 
Client and the UTM Mobile Application.  
Key finding K2 identified a potential barrier in effectively 
keeping UAS and manned aircraft safely separated. Coalescing 
industry for a common measure for altitude reporting and 
effective means for employing a separation by notification to 
support separation between UAS and manned aircraft will be 
future work of the UTM Research Transition Team (RTT) that 
was formed in 2016 between NASA and the FAA. The UTM 
RTT is an activity to jointly research and transfer UTM 
capabilities and technologies to the FAA that facilitate an 
efficient implementation of UTM operations 
Functionality to support priority operations was developed 
in the UTM research platform and future analysis will 
investigate the response times of the operators reacting to public 
service operations entering the airspace. The timeliness and 
information required for evacuating an area with a priority 
constraint will also be part of future UTM RTT evaluations.  
The flight test highlighted the potential hazard of imposing 
the altitude stratification airspace construct without the 
necessary technology and support available.  Imposing this 
structure will be necessary for efficient use of the airspace as 
density of UAS operations increase, however altitude 
stratification is not advisable for initial BVLOS introduction into 
the NAS. 
 
Figure 9: Cumulative distribution of percentage of lateral violations of the 
flight geography. 
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The UAS industry is a growing market that has the potential 
to revolutionize the aviation industry. However, challenges 
remain in facilitating the safe integration of BVLOS operations 
into the NAS. A UTM system can provide support to enable the 
proliferation of UAS operations. This report detailed the results 
of the NASA UTM Project’s TCL 2 flight test that investigated 
the feasibility of enabling multiple concurrent BVLOS 
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operations in close proximity of each other safely using the 
UTM research platform. The test was held at the Reno-Stead 
airport in October 2016 and consisted of 11 aircraft and 13.5 
flight hours. The test validated the need for awareness with 
regard to the plans of other operators, the risks inherent in 
different airspace users employing different altitude 
measurement methods, and the limitations imposed by 
insufficient weather products. Analysis was conducted on the 
degree to which UAS operators were able to conform to their 
operational areas. These findings will help enable multiple 
BVLOS operations and regulations. 
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Table 3: Summary of key findings and recommendations. 
UTM Core Principles and Guiding Tenet Tested Feature Key Findings Recommendations 
UAS should avoid each other 
Scheduling and Planning 
Conformance Alerting 
Proximity Alerting 
Separation by Segregation (e.g. Geo-
fencing) 
KF4 R5 
UAS should avoid manned aircraft Intruder Alerting Separation by Notification (e.g. NOTAM) KF2 R2 
UAS operators should have complete awareness of all 
constraints in the airspace 
UTM Mobile Application 
Contingency Management Alerts 
KF1 
KF3 
R1 
R3 
Public safety UAS have priority within the airspace Priority Operations Future Analysis 
Flexibility where possible and structure where necessary 
Altitude Stratification 
Dynamic Re-routing 
4D Segmented Flight Plans 
KF4 R4 
 
